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JUSTICE COURT
MONROE COUNTY
People v. McRobbie 1 10
(decided December 1, 1995)
Defendants made motions to dismiss misdemeanor charges for
driving while intoxicated in violation of sections 1192(2)111 and
1192(3)112 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law [hereinafter

VTL].

113

Defendants

argued that since their full driving

privileges were suspended at the arraignment, they had already
been punished and that continued prosecution for the same

charges would subject them to double jeopardy in violation of the
New York State1 1 4 and Federal Constitutions, 1 15 as well as the
New York Criminal Procedure Law. 1 16 The court held that the

prosecution's case pursuant to section 1192(2) of the VTL "rests
primarily on the introduction of some sort of chemical analysis
constituting a per se violation," and dismissed the charges against
110. 1995 WL 785019, at *1 (Just. Ct. Monroe County Dec. 1, 1995).
111. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Section
1192(2) provides:
Driving while intoxicated; per se. No person shall operate a motor
vehicle while such person has. 10 of one per centum or more by weight
of alcohol in the person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such
person's blood, breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to the provisions
of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article.
Id.
112. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Section
1192(3) provides: "Driving while intoxicated. No person shall operate a motor
vehicle while in an intoxicated condition." Id.
113. McRobbie, 1995 WL 785019, at *1.
114. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense...." Id.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." Id.
116. N.Y. Cvim. PROC. LAW § 40.20(1) (McKinney 1992). Section
40.20(1) states: "A person may not be twice prosecuted for the same offense."
Id.
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both defendants under section 1192(2).117 However, the court
found that under section 1192(3), the prosecutor had to prove that
the defendant's consumption of alcohol "rendered him incapable
of employing the physical or mental abilities needed in order to
operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver." 118 Since
this was not a per se violation, the court decreed that the charges
under section 1192(3) should remain in full force and effect. 119
The defendants, McRobbie and Gannon, were arrested and
charged with violating sections 1192(2) and 1192(3) of the
VTL. 120 Both defendants pled not guilty and had their full
driving privileges suspended. 12 1
In considering the claim, the court recognized that protections
against double jeopardy prevent reprosecution after acquittal,
reprosecution after conviction and protections against multiple
punishments for the same offense. 122 The court stated that these
guarantees are "fundamental to our system of justice and
consequently appl[y] to the states through the due process clause
12 3
of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Further, the court had to determine "whether the proceeding
was intended to be, or by its nature is, necessarily criminal and
punitive or civil and remedial." 124 In Helvering v. Mitchell,12 5
the United States Supreme Court held that a penalty imposed for
the fraudulent avoidance of income tax was "merely a remedial

117. McRobbie, 1995 WL 785019, at *7.
118. Id.

119. Id.
120. Id. at *1.
121. Id.

122. Id. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969) (holding
that where a judge imposes a harsher sentence on a defendant after a new trial,
the judge must affirmatively set forth reasons for imposing a harsher sentence).
123. McRobbie, 1995 WL 785019, at *1. See Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 785, 787 (1969) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth

Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
124. McRobbie, 1995 WL 785019, at *2.
125. 303 U.S. 391, 400 (1938) (holding that the forfeiture of goods and the
payment of sums of money are sanctions that have long been recognized as
civil proceedings).
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civil sanction."1 26 The McRobbie court stated that it was forced
to decide "whether or not the double jeopardy clause provided
protection only against repeat criminal punishments for the same
action." 12 7
In deciding this issue, the court employed a two prong test set
forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ward. 128 In the
first prong of the Ward test, the court must determine whether, in
establishing the penalizing mechanisms, Congress preferred the
label of criminal over civil sanction. 129 If Congress did intend to
establish a civil penalty, then under the second prong of Ward,
the court must inquire "whether the statutory scheme was so
punitive either in purpose or in effect as to negate that
intention." 130 In making a determination under the second prong,
"only the clearest proof could suffice to establish the
unconstitutionality of a statute on such ground." 131
However, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Halper132 turned the focus away from whether or not "a
proceeding was criminal and punitive and/or civil and remedial,
instead focusing on the issue of whether sanctions that were
admittedly civil could be so divorced from any remedial goal that
they constituted punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy
analysis." 133 Thus, the question in McRobbie was not whether
the "license suspending statute is civil or criminal, but rather
whether it is punishment." 134 Citing Halper, the McRobbie court
stated that "it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be
said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be
explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes

126. McRobbie, 1995 WL 785019,
127. Id. at *2.
128. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
129. McRobbie, 1995 WL 785019,
U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).
130. McRobbie, 1995 WL 785019,
131. Id.
132. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
133. McRobbie, 1995 WL 785019,
134. Id.

at *1.

at *2 (citing United States v. Ward, 448
at *2 (citations omitted).

at *4.
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is punishment as we have come to understand the term." 135

Thus, the court concluded that "it is the purposes actually served
by the sanction in question, not the underlying nature of the
proceeding giving rise to the sanction that must be evaluated." 136
After establishing that the timing of the sanctions were not a
factor in the analysis, the court analyzed whether the suspension
of a driver's license could properly be classified as "punishment"
under a Halper analysis. 137 The court noted that while Halper
dealt with monetary penalties, the language used in Halper was
broad enough to apply to any civil sanction, whether monetary or
not, "to the extent that it serves only as a deterrent or
8
retribution." 13
Applying Halper, the McRobbie court concluded that the
removal of a driver's license "cannot be said solely to relate to
the state's objective of removing drunk drivers from the road
because the lack of a driver's license will not guarantee a remedy
to the problem needing correction, that is, the behavior of the
drunken driver." 139 Thus, the court concluded that the
suspension of driver privileges did not serve a solely remedial
purpose, and that fburther prosecution under section 1192(2) of
the VTL would be barred by the protections against double
jeopardy. 140
However, the court stated that the charge of driving while
14 1
intoxicated under section 1192(3) of the VTL would survive.
In reaching the decision, the court looked to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Blockburger v. United States. 142 In
Blockburger, the Court stated that "[a] single act may be an
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *6. See also Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth

Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994) (holding that a tax on the possession of
contraband is "too far removed in crucial aspects from a standard tax
assessment to escape characterization as punishment for the purpose of Double
Jeopardy analysis").

139. McRobbie, 1995 WL 785019, at *6.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 284 U.S. 299 (1931).
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offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of
an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant
from prosecution and punishment under the other."143 Utilizing
the Blockburger test, the court in McRobbie found that the
People's proof in a prosecution under section 1192(3) of the VTL
"involves whether or not the defendant's consumption of alcohol
has rendered him incapable of employing the physical or mental
abilities needed to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent
driver."144 Since the People had to prove additional facts under
the section 1192(3) prosecution, rather than section 1192(2), the
court held that the charges pursuant to section 1192(3) of the
VTL would remain in full force and effect as they did not
constitute a double jeopardy violation. 145

143. Id. at 304 (citations omitted).
144. McRobbie, 1995 WL 785019, at *7.
145. Id.
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